1. Russian propaganda intensifies speculation around the topic of peace talks.

The Center predicts that in the coming weeks, Russian propaganda and Russian officials will intensify speculation around the topic of possible negotiations to achieve peace in Ukraine.

Different kinds of speculations, manipulations, outright disinformation and conspiracy theories are expected to be spread, aimed at discrediting the possible negotiation process and shifting the responsibility for the continuation of the war from Russia to Ukraine, the United States and other Western countries.

The target audience of this disinformation campaign will be both Ukrainian citizens and residents of the West and the Global South. 

In particular, the Center predicts a reinforcement of the narrative about the alleged unwillingness of the Ukrainian authorities to negotiate and plans to “fight to the last Ukrainian.” Ukraine will be accused of trying to disrupt the negotiations. Meanwhile, theories will be spread about the EU’s alleged desire to continue the war “with the hands of Ukrainians,” despite US President Donald Trump’s sincere desire to reach a deal with Russia.

Moreover, disinformation messages with new “plans for peace” and “terms of a peace agreement” and conspiracy theories about who really benefits from the war and who makes money from it will continue to be pushed in the information space.

Comments by Russian officials are expected to increase, with statements that Russia has never refused to negotiate and is always ready to talk, along with claims about the alleged “illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government” and obviously unacceptable demands for the start of negotiations and agreements to end the fighting.

The purpose of these actions is to discredit the idea of negotiations as much as possible, to create an atmosphere of chaos and absurdity around them, and to create emotional swings among the population in order to promote the demands for Ukraine’s surrender in this situation.

2. Intensification of Kremlin disinformation campaigns on the occasion of the anniversary of Russia’s occupation of Crimea (February 20) and the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion (February 24).

The Center predicts that Russia’s propaganda campaigns will intensify in the run-up to key dates related to Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories. It is expected that the main propaganda efforts will be focused on promoting the narrative around the alleged “major positive changes” in the lives of residents of the so-called “new regions” of Russia and Crimea under Russian rule. 

The occupiers will place great emphasis on the development of infrastructure projects. In particular, the reconstruction of residential buildings in Mariupol and other cities, the construction of a highway and a railroad connecting Russia with Crimea. To do this, they will actively involve “happy locals” who will thank the Russian authorities and Putin personally. Much attention will also be paid to the social assistance that “residents of the new regions” will receive. In addition, the spread of narratives about the “historical justice of returning Russia’s ancestral territories to it” and mass support for the occupation by the population is expected to intensify.

At the same time, they will keep silent about the real state of affairs with infrastructure and living conditions in the TOT. These narratives will be aimed at Western audiences as well, in order to “normalize” the occupation of a part of Ukraine in the minds of ordinary residents of Western countries. To do this, the Kremlin will actively engage a network of Russian-controlled media, experts, and bot farms.

It is also expected that the narrative of Ukraine as a “failed state” and the possibility of dividing Ukraine’s territory between neighboring states will be spread among Western audiences. In particular, an increase in the number of fakes is predicted, as if the leaders of neighboring countries have already taken practical steps to seize the western regions of Ukraine.

3. Before May 9 and the 80th anniversary of the victory in World War II, ru-propagandists will intensify speculations about the memory of the victims of this war and the subject of “Nazism.” 

On February 2, Volgograd hosted events dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. The Center predicts that propagandists may intensify their campaign to accuse the West of “hushing up the role of Russians in defeating the Nazism,” “restoring fascism,” and preparing a “genocide of Russians.” 

It is possible that Russians may actively manipulate the concept of “Nazism” by equating modern opponents with Nazis. Through the use of symbols of Soviet victory and St. George’s ribbons, the Kremlin will justify its aggressive actions and militarize the memory of the war. All of this will be part of Russia’s large-scale propaganda campaign, the essence of which is to speculate around the historical memory of World War II, justify the war against Ukraine and spread hatred of the West among its own citizens.

4. Disinformation campaigns in Germany, the main goal of which is to influence the early parliamentary elections on February 23. 

In the run-up to the early parliamentary elections in Germany, the Center predicts an intensification of Russia’s disinformation campaigns aimed at the German population in order to influence the results of the vote. 

It is expected that narratives will intensify through German-language resources of the Russian Federation, social networks, Russian cultural and diplomatic institutions that “support for Ukraine is destroying the German economy” and “bringing the war to Germany”, that “anti-Russian sanctions are primarily harming the German economy”, and that the only way to solve the current problems of ordinary Germans is to establish cooperation with Russia, especially by resuming the supply of Russian energy resources. 

Campaigns to discredit German politicians who support Ukraine and tougher sanctions, as well as distortions of their statements, are expected to intensify. New attempts by Russia to hack websites and servers containing voter data or other cybercrime by Russians are possible. 

It is possible that during the demonstration against the Munich Security Conference and NATO, which is scheduled for February 15 in Munich, including with the support of left-wing and far-right political forces in Germany and other organizations, provocations by pro-Russian figures are likely. 

According to German analytical reports, Russia spends about 2 billion euros a year on disinformation campaigns in Germany.

5. Attempts to influence the presidential election in Romania, where a second round of voting is scheduled for March 23.

The Center predicts that Russian agents of influence may actively disseminate anti-Ukrainian statements by certain local politicians and amplify the rhetoric that Ukraine is a proxy state, that military aid is wasteful and threatens to escalate the conflict, and that Kyiv lives off the backs of Western countries.

Efforts to discredit the current Romanian government and Romanian politicians who are pro-Ukrainian and pro-European are likely to intensify.

There is a high probability that Russia will intensify its efforts to promote Eurosceptic and anti-Western sentiments among Romanian residents. Speculation on religious grounds and the extension of Romania’s alleged territorial claims to certain Ukrainian territories are possible.

6. Russia’s disinformation campaigns around Syria and the problems with keeping Russian military bases there.

The Center predicts that after the first visit of the Russian delegation to Syria and negotiations with the new government, Russian officials and propagandists will continue to spread optimistic rhetoric about the fate of Russian military bases in Syria, express favorable comments about the new Syrian government and, presumably, moderate criticism of Bashar al-Assad and his entourage. 

These actions are part of Moscow’s attempts to distance itself from its previous support for the ousted regime and its war crimes against the Syrian people in order to protect its image from negative associations. 

In the event of the loss of military bases, Russian propagandists can position the impact of this step as insignificant.