The Center for Countering Disinformation (hereinafter – the Center) analysed the Spanish-language segment of social media X to identify accounts whose activities could be used by the kremlin’s propaganda machine, as well as the tools they use to influence Spanish-speaking users.

As a result of the conducted analysis, the Center has drawn the following conclusions:

To spread propaganda among Spanish-speaking audiences, the russian federation may use certain accounts on X, whose combined audience amounts to 834,100 subscribers (as of August 7, 2025, according to data from X).

As a result of the analysis, the Center identified 12 such accounts, 5 of which are anonymous:

Three of the accounts are media projects or have features typical of them:

* ¡Ahí les va! (@ahilesvainfo) and Sepa Más (@Sepa_mass) are the projects of the russian international propaganda media RT.

** Based on the analysis of the content of the El Ojo account (@ElOjoEn), it can be concluded that it is a media project, which is confirmed by the news-style format of its publications.

The remaining four accounts belong to specific individuals:

 

Other findings of the analysis include: 

• half of the analysed accounts were created between February and September 2022: Rusia Informa (@RusiaInforma); Sarah Ilych RIA Novosti (@Sarah83336937); ¡Ahí les va! (@ahilesvainfo); El Ojo (@ElOjoEn); Sepa Más (@Sepa_mass) and Eureka News (@EurekaNews10);

• some accounts are likely to be collaborating with each other or belong to a single network, publishing similar or identical content.

The analysed accounts use the following tools to disseminate messages and interact with their audience: 

• Materials generated using artificial intelligence.
• Whataboutism and manipulative contrasts.
• Adaptation to regional cultural specifics and biases.
• Materials that may be part of russian disinformation campaigns.
• Fake and / or manipulative messages.
• References to pseudo-sources to increase credibility.
• References to questionable or pro-kremlin sources.
• Provocative language and rhetoric that can be characterised as hate speech.
• Use of humor, satire, and trolling.
• Manipulative use of information about real events.
• Use of anti-Western rhetoric.

Some examples illustrating the use of these tools:

The Center identified information campaigns involving the above-mentioned accounts:

CAMPAIGN 1:
Fake messages about the detention of Ukrainian special services officers in Iran. 

It was claimed that allegedly three Ukrainian special services officers were detained in Isfahan (Iran) for attempting to attack a drone manufacturing factory. The accounts involved in spreading the information are Desde Las Trincheras (@DOGDEGA), Lyudmila Z (@asturestepa), Sarah Ilych RIA Novosti (@Sarah83336937) and Eureka News (@EurekaNews10).

On June 22, 2025, the Center debunked this fake, noting that the publication about the alleged detention of three Ukrainian special services officers, which was referenced by most of the accounts, did not exist, and that its screenshot was fabricated. The Center noted that the intensity of similar messages appearing in such a short period of time could indicate inauthentic behaviour by accounts, likely aimed at discrediting Ukraine against the backdrop of the escalating security situation in the Middle East.

CAMPAIGN 2:

Disinformation about the murder of the deputy head of the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center.

 As part of the campaign, false messages were spread about the murder of the deputy head of the local Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre (TRSSC) in Kyiv. The accounts involved in spreading this information are Desde Las Trincheras (@DOGDEGA), Sarah Ilych RIA Novosti (@Sarah83336937) and Eureka News (@EurekaNews10).

On July 8, 2025, the Center reported that the information about the murder of the deputy head of the TRSSC in the Desnianskyi district of Kyiv was not true. After verifying the information with the National Police of Ukraine, the Center confirmed that the deceased was not a military serviceman.

CAMPAIGN 3:

Fake messages about the alleged cremation of fallen Ukrainian soldiers in the Ternopil region.

It was claimed that in the Ternopil region, the bodies of deceased Ukrainian soldiers were allegedly being secretly cremated to avoid paying financial compensation to their families. The accounts involved in spreading the information Lyudmila Z are (@asturestepa), Marian (@marianpy1) AND El Ojo (@ElOjoEn).

 

On July 10, 2025, the Center debunked this information, stating that there is in fact no functioning crematorium in Ternopil or Ternopil region. Therefore, the purpose of this fake message may have been to discredit the authorities and spread despair among the families of Ukrainian servicemen.

General conclusion

The analysed Spanish-language accounts on X are likely used to spread disinformation aimed at discrediting Ukraine and its Western partners, as well as justifying russian aggression. The alignment of the content and the use of common tools of influence may confirm their coordinated activity. To increase the impact, fake photos and videos, references to questionable sources, manipulation of real events, satire, and anti-Western rhetoric are actively used.