The question of the level of readiness, expectations and timing of the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive is of great concern to the community of both Ukraine and russia as well as the West. Well-known Western and Ukrainian experts and politicians in the period from the end of March express their vision and forecasts of the development of events.
The head of the country V. Zelenskyy did not specify the dates of the start of the offensive, but emphasized that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are aware of all the plans of the russians and Ukrainian soldiers are preparing to “liberate our land.” According to him, in order to start the liberation process, Ukraine needs to receive additional arms and ammunition from the allies.
Secretary of the NSDC of Ukraine O. Danilov believes that “Ukraine will not launch a counteroffensive unprepared, and it is only a matter of time before Ukraine reaches the level of military readiness for counteroffensive actions.”
The Minister of Defense of Ukraine O. Reznikov also announced this year the release of temporarily occupied territories at “the most suitable moment, which will be decided by the General Staff.”
The head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence, K. Budanov, has absolutely no doubt in the near future of the “significant battle for the modern history of Ukraine”, during which “going to the borders of 1991 is a completely achievable task this year.”
US Defense Secretary L. Austin said that Ukraine has a “very good chance” of launching a successful counteroffensive this spring.
Reports about the slowdown of russian operations and the probability of success of a large-scale counteroffensive by the Defense Forces of Ukraine are increasingly appearing in the russian information space. Fears are spreading there that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will launch a counteroffensive before the russian defense-industrial base gets a chance to increase production and strengthen russia’s defense potential. In particular, most of the units of russia in important areas of the front are staffed by mobilized fighters who are not motivated and professionally ready to repel the offensive. However, Western leaders believe that putin can respond to the beginning of a counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine with all the tools he has left, without ruling out the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Currently, russian special services are purposefully spreading fakes and disinformation in order to disrupt the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and slow down aid from allies. The most resonant PSYOP, the kremlin’s involvement in which is practically proven, is the “dumping” of falsified “secret documents of the USA and NATO”, which seem to indicate Ukraine’s unpreparedness for a counteroffensive. However, even if there are actual NATO documents among the forged materials, most of them contain only predictive estimates, some of which have already lost relevance or have not been confirmed (in particular, regarding the claims of the capture of Bakhmut by the end of February).
What conclusions can be drawn?
Firstly, the flow of military aid from partners and calls to the population in the temporarily occupied territories to evacuate are quite convincing evidence of the inevitability of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. After all, not only the fate of Ukraine, but also the future of Europe depends on what will happen at the front.
Secondly, the timing of the start of any counteroffensive is determined by the level of readiness of its three stages – preparation of reserves, identification of weak points in the enemy’s defense and a convenient moment to strike. All stages do not have clear dates, because each subsequent stage depends on the successful completion of the previous one. Preparations for the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive are progressing properly, we expect the completion of deliveries of Western weapons and the establishment of suitable weather.
Thirdly, the defense of Bakhmut plays a key role in exhausting the enemy and distracting russia from preparing to counter the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Currently, attempts to quickly capture the city did not yield convincing results, and the occupiers are returning to the defensive plan in at least 5 areas where active offensive actions continued (Kupyansk, Luhansk, Bakhmut, the city of Avdiivka-Donetsk and western Donetsk/eastern Zaporizhzhia).
Fourth, the preparation of such a military operation as a counteroffensive requires informational isolation until it is sufficiently safe for our military. After all, public statements about the state of readiness and the timing of the start of a counteroffensive can be part of an information war on both sides, aimed at misleading the opponent. On this occasion, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine G. Malyar called on Ukrainians to maintain informational silence, not to discuss the details of the counteroffensive and generally not to publicly discuss the plans of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, so as not to interfere with the military doing its work. Only three persons in Ukraine have the right to publicize strategic military plans and ideas – the President as Supreme Commander, the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was the regime of informational silence and the closure of the combat zone for journalists during the counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region that made it possible to implement the most successful military operation to liberate the occupied territories since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
