Disputes between the leader of the Russian private military company “Wagner” Prigozhin and the head of the Chechen Republic Kadyrov about the intention to exchange their units in the Bakhmut area remain in the shadows not only because of the greater attention of the community to the “strikes” of the Kremlin, participants in the parade on Red Square and problems with the continuation of the “grain agreement. » The Kremlin finds it very inconvenient to acknowledge the existence of conflicts between Kremlin clans, such as Prigozhin/Kadyrov and Shoigu/Gerasimov as it discredits Putin’s narrative about the unity of the army and the people’s faith in victory in Ukraine. 
Prigozhin made the problem of ammunition public and actually blackmailed the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, threatening to replace the “Wagnerians” in Bakhmut with Chechen fighters. Recently, Prigozhin published a video of the killed mercenaries and made an emotional statement that the “Wagners” would leave Bakhmut by May 10, due to a lack of ammunition.
Prigozhin’s quarrel with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation went so far that it forced Putin to intervene. According to his order dated May 7, the commander of the occupation forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, General Gerasimov, is required to resume the supply of ammunition and weapons to the “Wagner” fighters and the deputy commander of the Russian group in Ukraine, General Surovikin, is appointed to act as a mediator between the Russian Federation and the PMC.
What is really behind the events surrounding Prigozhin, Kadyrov and Shoigu and Putin’s reaction?
First of all, the demonstrative quarrel between the military leadership and the “Wagner” mercenaries, as well as statements about the withdrawal of troops from Bakhmut, may be a special information operation by the Kremlin to distract the attention of the Armed Forces and “cover up” Russia’s preparations for an attack in other directions.
Therefore, Prigozhin’s scandalous claims about the lack of ammunition at the front do not correspond to reality, and Ukrainian officials have not observed a decrease in the scale of “Wagner” PMC shelling of Ukrainian territories during this period.
Secondly, Prigozhin and Kadyrov discredit the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in front of Putin and accuse the regular Russian troops of inefficiency in order to deflect the blame for the inability to capture Bakhmut quickly and blame Shoigu for future failures.
Kadyrov’s involvement in Prigozhin’s initiatives is an attempt to return to major Russian politics and a chance to regain an influential position within Putin’s close circle.
It is interesting how Kadyrov blamed Prigozhina for washing dirty linen in public and at the same time officially asked Putin to send units of the Chechen special forces “Akhmat” to Bakhmut instead of the “Wagner” PMC.
Kadyrov’s willingness to transfer his troops to Bakhmut gives him an opportunity to improve his reputation with Russian political circles and and present the battle for Bakhmut as exclusively Kadyrov’s affair.
However, Kadyrov’s claims that “Akhmat” will be able to occupy Bakhmut in a matter of hours are evaluated by experts of the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) as typical Kadyrov bragging, which ignores the real tactical situation in the city.
Moreover, the withdrawal of about 4,000 ” Kadyrovtsy” from the Russian defense lines in the area of Belogorivka on the Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Zaporizhia region to Bakhmut will inevitably lead to a conflict with Russian regular troops and disrupt preparations for the planned offensive.
Thirdly, Putin’s reaction to the situation shows that Shoigu/Gerasimov’s attempts to take control of all Russian irregular forces in the winter of 2023 failed and the army generals lost Putin’s favor in the spring.
Against the background of a systemic crisis of power, the dictator avoids firing members of his inner circle due to the lack of personnel to fully replace them and the desire to thus restrain their real intentions to seize power in the Kremlin.
Therefore, despite the situational loss, the military (shoigu) clan has not fundamentally changed its intentions regarding removing competitors from direct contact with Putin. The Prigozhin/Kadyrov group will try to use the situation to consolidate Putin’s trust and the ability to influence military decision-making.
Currently, the willingness of the Russian dictator to continue restraining the “spiders in the Kremlin’s web” depends on their success on the front lines. Therefore, Prihodko’s struggle to capture Bachmut will continue, while the Russian Armed Forces will maintain limited offensive actions in other directions (according to the forecasts of the Institute for the Study of War – to the northeast of Kupyansk and the south of Kreminnaya).
However, the unfolding events indicate that the Kremlin is beginning to seek individuals who can be held responsible for the failure of the Russian forces in the war against Ukraine. The smoldering conflict between the command of the Russian Armed Forces and the private military group (PMG) is favorable because it deepens the problem with the chain of command and limits the ability of Russian commanders to carry out planned measures to counter a future Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.